BNP refrained from overtly anti-Indian posturing, even amid charged public sentiment. It did not demand the wholesale abrogation of agreements signed under the previous government, instead advocating what it termed a dignified and mutually respectful foreign policy, writes Farrukh Khosru
The early signals from New Delhi following Tarique Rahman’s assumption of office as Prime Minister have been notably measured. There has been no overt expression of displeasure; on the contrary, an invitation to visit India has already been extended. This stands in stark contrast to the atmosphere that prevailed when Dr Muhammad Yunus assumed responsibility as Chief Adviser. At that time, bilateral rhetoric frequently carried an edge, and policy decisions — including visa restrictions imposed on six leaders of the Anti-Discrimination Student Movement on 2 September 2024 — contributed to a sharp downturn in cross-border movement. Travel slowed dramatically, and businesses in eastern India, particularly in Kolkata, felt the impact.
The tensions of that period were compounded by events along shared rivers. Following the July–August mass uprising in Bangladesh, severe flooding engulfed nine eastern districts. The discharge of water from the Dumbur Dam in Tripura’s Gomati basin — followed shortly by releases from the Farakka Barrage — fuelled perceptions in Bangladesh of punitive “water diplomacy”. Whether coincidental or not, the timing hardened public suspicion that political developments in Dhaka were being met with strategic signalling from across the border.
Yet the tone has since shifted. On 31 December 2025, India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, travelled to Dhaka to pay respects following the death of former Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia, meeting Tarique Rahman in the process. Weeks later, India’s Lok Sabha Speaker, Om Birla, attended Rahman’s swearing-in ceremony and reiterated the invitation for an official visit. Such gestures, while diplomatic in form, are politically significant. They suggest that both sides recognise the necessity — and perhaps the inevitability — of engagement.
Dr Yunus presided over a politically sensitive period, culminating in elections conducted without the participation of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League — historically regarded as Delhi’s closest partner in Bangladesh. The BNP’s decisive victory in that context inevitably prompted recalibration in Indian strategic circles. For India, the question is not merely who governs in Dhaka, but under what terms and with which alignments.
Historically, BNP-led governments have experienced friction with India over security cooperation and transit arrangements. Concerns in Delhi have also extended to the BNP’s relationship with Jamaat-e-Islami and the implications for India’s North-Eastern security calculus. These anxieties are not abstract: cross-border insurgency and intelligence cooperation have long formed the backbone of bilateral trust.
Yet India’s perception of Tarique Rahman has evolved. A decade ago, when Narendra Modi first assumed office in 2014, Rahman — then in exile in London — sought to open channels with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The calculation was straightforward: with Congress and the Gandhi family no longer at the helm in Delhi, an opportunity might exist to reset relations. Ideological overlap, both parties being broadly centre-right, appeared to offer common ground. But the overture did not yield immediate results.
Two obstacles stood in the way. First, Sheikh Hasina’s government moved swiftly to consolidate its own relationship with the Modi administration, making clear that engagement with its principal domestic rival would carry consequences. Second, Indian security agencies remained wary of allegations linking Rahman and his associates to past incidents, including the Chittagong arms haul and the grenade attack on Sheikh Hasina. In the calculus of national security, such perceptions matter.
The watershed moment came after 5 August 2024, when Sheikh Hasina left office and subsequently sought refuge in India. Delhi faced a new reality: the Awami League’s political rehabilitation would not be straightforward. At the same time, the BNP refrained from overtly anti-Indian posturing, even amid charged public sentiment. It did not demand the wholesale abrogation of agreements signed under the previous government, instead advocating what it termed a dignified and mutually respectful foreign policy.
In interviews, including one with the BBC in October 2025, Rahman adopted a cautious tone regarding India’s decision to shelter Hasina. He avoided inflammatory rhetoric and did not threaten coercive measures. For policymakers in Delhi, such restraint — combined with practical considerations — likely contributed to a reassessment.
India’s economic stakes in Bangladesh are substantial. Infrastructure projects, including the near-complete Agartala–Akhaura rail link, remain strategically important. Cross-border trade and connectivity, though disrupted, are integral to both economies. At the same time, India has watched with unease the interim government’s engagement with Pakistani military officials, mindful of sensitivities in its North-East.
The emerging consensus in Delhi appears pragmatic: a stable, elected government in Dhaka is preferable to prolonged uncertainty. In that framework, the BNP — now in power — becomes the unavoidable interlocutor. The burden, however, is mutual. Prime Minister Rahman must demonstrate that Bangladesh’s sovereignty and India’s security interests are not mutually exclusive propositions. India, for its part, must accept that political pluralism in Bangladesh inevitably reshapes the bilateral equation.
The recalibration underway is less about personalities than about realism. Geography dictates cooperation; history complicates it. The challenge for both governments is to replace suspicion with structured engagement — and to recognise that in South Asia’s crowded strategic landscape, durable stability depends not on preferred partners, but on sustainable partnerships.