Dr Forqan Uddin Ahmed
In January 2026, Bangladesh is at a turning point in its political history. With the July Revolution, an 18-month interim government came to an end, declaring the general election scheduled to be held on February 12, 2026. The very topic is hereby presented and prepared, aiming to havean analysis or review and giving an emphasis to the following questions as depicted here. Who will be the next prime minister, and where will Bangladeshi politics go?
This discussion is not merely about individuals or political parties; rather, it is the story of rebuilding a collapsed state system and searching for a new political culture. After the fall of a centralised system of governance that lasted for more than a decade and a half, Bangladesh now stands at a crossroads—one that is full of promise, yet fraught with challenges. On 30 December 2025, following a prolonged illness, the passing of BNP Chairperson Begum Khaleda Zia created a profound vacuum in Bangladesh’s political landscape. With her death, the long-standing chapter of “acting leadership” within the BNP came to an end. According to the party constitution, Tarique Rahman formally assumed the position of BNP Chairman. Although he led the party from London for 17 years, in the lead-up to the 2026 election, he has been directing party activities through digital platforms and close engagement with grassroots supporters.
At present, the most widely discussed name for the position of Prime Minister is BNP Chairman Tarique Rahman. BNP’s grassroots activists firmly believe that if the party wins the 12 February election, Tarique Rahman will become the Prime Minister with a popular mandate. His primary challenge now is to establish himself as a “reformist” leader—an image he seeks to project through his proposed “31-point” state reform agenda. Another major challenge accompanying the change in BNP leadership is maintaining party unity. Prolonged absence from power has left many leaders and activists inactive; some have withdrawn from politics altogether, while others have taken alternative political paths. In this context, preserving unity within the party poses a significant test for the leadership.
Although Tarique Rahman has emphasised unity in his messaging, questions remain about how effectively that unity is being realised on the ground. BNP considers the upcoming national election on 12 February as both a struggle for political survival and the final stage of “restoring democracy.” In the aftermath of the 2024 revolution, legal and political complexities have prevented the Awami League from participating in the election. As a result, BNP now faces Jamaat-e-Islami and several new political forces that emerged from the July Revolution as its principal competitors. BNP is working toward securing a single-party majority and has presented its 31-point reform agenda as its central electoral pledge.
BNP views the 12 February national election as a fight for survival and the final stage of “restoring democracy.” Due to legal and political complications following the 2024 revolution, the Awami League is unable to participate. As a result, BNP’s primary competitors are Jamaat-e-Islami and new political forces that emerged from the July Revolution. By taking advantage of this circumstance, the BNP hopes to win an absolute majority. The party’s “31-Point” reform plan which emphasizes decentralization of power, a bicameral parliament, and balances on prime ministerial authority. The issues that especially appeal to young voters have been portrayed as the main campaign commitment. However, several pervasive crises provide significant difficulties. Throughout 2025, incidents of mob justice and lynching increased alarmingly. Allegations of land grabbing and extortion have been raised against some BNP activists. Although Tarique Rahman has warned of strict disciplinary action, restoring order at the grassroots remains a major challenge. The future of Bangladesh’s politics does not depend on a single individual. The prospect of a coalition government is being aggressively explored. A national consensus administration incorporating Jamaat-e-Islami and new revolutionary political parties may form if the BNP is unable to achieve a clear majority. A prime minister who is acceptable to students, the general public, and political parties may take power in such a situation. Many believe that to sustain the structural reforms initiated by the interim government under Dr Muhammad Yunus, a technocrat or balanced figure is necessary. A growing anti-personality-cult sentiment has emerged among the public. People want a Prime Minister who governs as a servant of the people rather than with arrogance of power.
One of the most significant changes shaping the future of politics lies in voter psychology. Nearly one-third of voters in the 2026 election belong to the younger generation, who are not lifelong supporters of any single party. They evaluate politics based on merit, integrity, and public service. This generation will be the true arbiter of future politics. They reject dynastic politics and hereditary transfers of power. Consequently, whichever party forms the government will face the challenge of ensuring employment opportunities for educated youth and protecting freedom of expression. Failure to meet these expectations could once again plunge Bangladesh into political instability. The future of Bangladesh’s politics does not depend on a single individual alone. In the context of the 2026 election, the possibility of a coalition government is being widely discussed. If BNP fails to secure an outright majority, a national consensus government may emerge through cooperation between Jamaat-e-Islami and new political forces born out of the July Revolution. In such a scenario, the Prime Minister could be a figure acceptable not only to political parties but also to students, the general public, and the international community. Many believe that to maintain continuity of the fundamental state reforms initiated by the interim government under Dr Muhammad Yunus, a technocrat or a balanced, non-partisan personality may be required. There is a growing anti–personality-cult sentiment among the people of Bangladesh, leading to a preference for a Prime Minister who governs as a servant of the people rather than as a power-wielding authority.
Bangladesh’s politics has now reached a stage where “politics of bread” and economic survival outweigh the traditional “politics of votes.” Ultimately, the leader who can ensure affordable food and a dignified quality of life will endure. Another crucial aspect of future politics is decentralisation and the balance of power. Experience has taught the people of Bangladesh that excessive concentration of authority in the Prime Minister’s office inevitably leads to authoritarianism. Therefore, demands for amending Article 70 of the Constitution, establishing a bicameral parliament, and ensuring full judicial independence have evolved from theoretical debates into mass demands. Regardless of which party assumes power, these reforms must be implemented. Only if the next Prime Minister willingly relinquishes power will genuine democracy take root. Otherwise, there will merely be a change of rulers, not of the system.
The 2026 election is imminent. Repeating conventional electoral practices that ignore changed realities is unacceptable to the people. Concerns have arisen over the appointment of Deputy Commissioners as Returning Officers, which many view as reinforcing administrative control over elections and undermining credibility. Post-uprising public opinion favours district election officers, judicial officials, or other qualified professionals appointed as returning officers (RO). Additionally, without meaningful reforms to the Representation of the People Order (RPO), including issues such as polling agents’ deployment, voting rights of election officials, expatriate voting, multi-day voting, simplified nomination procedures, and candidates’ educational qualifications, even procedural and ethical improvements within the existing system will be insufficient. An election conducted without strengthening the Election Commission’s institutional capacity risks becoming controversial once again. Can the government or the Election Commission evade responsibility for such failure?
In conclusion, the question of the next Prime Minister and the future of Bangladesh’s politics reflects a complex, multi-layered, and evolving reality. It is not simply about who comes to power, but about the philosophy of governance, political culture, and collective public aspirations. If Bangladesh’s politics can embrace this changing reality and make space for new leadership and ideas, the future may become more democratic, inclusive, and sustainable. Otherwise, the country risks remaining trapped within old structures, where the question of “the next Prime Minister” continues to arise without fulfilling public expectations. Good governance and corruption are also critical concerns. A large segment of the population now demands administrative transparency and accountability. If the future Prime Minister fails to meet these expectations, political legitimacy may erode rapidly. As a result, morality, transparency, and commitment to the rule of law are emerging as the primary driving forces of future politics. If the 12 February election is free and fair, and if the subsequent government abandons politics of revenge and focuses on state reform, Bangladesh can reach its desired destination. The dream of a non-discriminatory, democratic, and prosperous Bangladesh envisioned by students and citizens must become the guiding objective of future politics. The next Prime Minister must serve as the tireless guardian of that dream.
(The writer is a former Deputy Director General, Bangladesh Ansar and VDP. He is also a Rotary Learning Facilitator, Rotary Club, Dhaka Elite.)
